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Commentary & Reply
On ”Fighting the ‘Islamic State’ The Case for US
Ground Forces”
Dakota L. Wood
This commentary is in response to David E. Johnson's article “Fighting the ‘Islamic State’
The Case for US Ground Forces” published in the Spring 2015 issue of Parameters (vol.
45, no. 1).

I

am writing to commend Dr. David Johnson on his superb essay
“Fighting the Islamic State: The Case for Ground Forces.” He asks
the key question “does our strategy fit the war we are in,” clearly
explains why it does not, and then cogently makes the case why more
should be done. At the heart of this issue is, or should be, the central
objective of accomplishing war aims that lead to achieving national political objectives. If destruction of the Islamic State is indeed an objective,
as has been stated by the White House, whether for its own value or as
a necessary step to securing Iraq, then competent ground forces of sufficient capacity to accomplish the job must be committed. Anything less
simply undermines the credibility of policies issued by the White House
and supported by Congress, wastes resources, and incentivizes the very
groups and behaviors our policies and efforts are meant to combat.
Making the case for a minimalist approach, as many do, based
on the argument others should “step up” to see to their own interests
misses the point. US interests should be considered first, and securing
those interests should not be critically dependent on the competence of
others. Conditions in Iraq and Syria affecting US interests have evolved
well beyond the problems of insurgency and terrorism. The real issues
are America’s role in global affairs, and the perceptions of friends, allies,
competitors, and enemies about America’s competence and reliability. In
simpler terms, the advances by the Islamic State in Iraq and the ripple
effect they have in the Middle East, raises the question whether America
is still a force to be reckoned with.
Withdrawing completely from Iraq would save America the cost of
the blood and treasure needed to change conditions on the ground in
a substantial way. But other costs would be incurred, costs measured
in loss of an ability to influence outcomes, the tragic loss of life being
reported on a daily basis, the entrenchment of an odious regime, and
loss of reputation the United States has previously enjoyed in standing
up to such brutality. Remaining minimally involved risks all the previous plus the added costs in treasure and (potentially) casualties, with
little likelihood of success. Islamic State forces, and actors from Iran to
Hezbollah, can then earn propaganda points by gaining victories even
with the United States “involved.” Increased US commitment, along the
lines proposed by Johnson, though it incurs risks, offers an opportunity
for the Unites States to reassert itself, change the conditions enabling
and incentivizing Iran and others in the Middle East, and to send clear
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messages to Russia, China, North Korea, and a host of friends/allies that
the United States remains the preeminent power and must be accounted
for in their calculations.
Per Johnson’s call for strategic clarity, there is an urgent need for
such signals well beyond our immediate interests in Iraq. Like a matryoshka doll, individual incidents, though small in their local context,
actually nest within larger matters that ultimately have profound, strategic importance. We may not care whether the Islamic State or the Iraqi
government controls some small border town, but placed in the larger
context of regional stability, competitions for power and influence, and
the deterrent value of perceived power, our interest and involvement
in the battle between the Islamic State and the Iraqi government have
far-reaching consequences. Thus, our involvement should be assessed
within this larger strategic context.
In light of the above and his call for action, I am curious whether
the author has considered the vexing question: “What then?” Even if the
United States found the will to commit ground forces for the purpose
of “removing the Islamic State from Iraq,” what strategic end would it
serve? Does the author presume the United States would unilaterally
withdraw—satisfied with “mission accomplished” vis-à-vis the Islamic
State ejected from Iraq; continue operations into Syria to destroy the
Islamic State as a viable conventional military force; and/or perhaps
sustain some sort of military presence in Iraq for some larger purpose?
Destroying the Islamic State has value if only to rid the region, and the
world, of its evil. But absent some larger purpose, it will be a hard sell to
convince anyone in Washington or the American public at large that it
is worth hazarding the lives of their sons and daughters to revisit a place
that does not seem to worry much about its own long-term interests.

On ”Fighting the ‘Islamic State’ The Case for
US Ground Forces”
Michael Spangler
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was dismayed by David Johnson’s article on “Fighting the Islamic
State.” Because the article contains strong implications for US foreign
policy, it deserves a serious counterargument to the commitment of
US ground forces to Iraq (and Syria).
Initially, it is hard to refute David Johnson’s argument that the
United States needs to commit US ground forces to defeat and not
merely degrade ISIS. Johnson makes a clear case for ISIS to be considered a proto-state that will continue to exploit serious deficiencies in
the Iraqi Security Forces stemming from their lack of basic “enablers”
such as air, artillery, intelligence and logistics support. In addition, ISIS
benefits from its blitzkrieg seizure of several Iraqi and Syrian cities and
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their financial resources, largely due to the military leadership of many
of Saddam Hussein’s former senior officers. The US failure to keep
intact much of Saddam’s civilian and military bureaucracy as well as later
abandoning the largely Sunni “Sons of Iraq” partnership which formed
in 2006-2007 directly undermined the US strategic intent for Iraq and
now Syria. Finally, Johnson reminds us Iran-backed Shia militias and
the Kurdish Peshmerga are hardly disinterested security providers but
constitute often virulently anti-Arab Sunni elements in the fight. Thus,
Johnson makes his case for US ground forces as the “last man standing”
to defeat ISIS.
Despite the cogency of Johnson’s argument, I believe the commitment of US ground forces would be a strategic mistake for three main
reasons. First, a US intervention would likely attract greater numbers of
recruits and money to the ISIS cause. The United States remains highly
unpopular in many Muslim countries for a number of reasons, but its
entry at this time would only strengthen ISIS’s claim that it is the vanguard advancing the Islamist cause against non-believers and crusaders.
Secondly, a US ground force commitment, as we all know, must be sized
and financed. How many ground forces are required in Iraq and Syria
and for how long? Estimates range from 150,000 to 300,000 troops,
depending on the model used, costing about 150 to 300 billion dollars
per year. This posture is simply politically and financially unsustainable
for the United States over the long term. Finally, the commitment of
US ground forces is likely to fall into another “dependency” trap where
host-nation forces cannot stand on their own feet because we assume
they can never be adequately recruited, trained, and equipped. Hence
the United States would be trapped in what Dexter Filkins calls the
“forever war.”
As military commentaries, books, and articles proliferate on the
ISIS fight, I am concerned so few of them discuss the shortfalls and mistakes the United States made in providing initial assistance and advice
to the Iraqi Security Forces. I encourage a dialogue to discuss what the
United States and its allies did, both right and wrong, and how it can
improve on such efforts in the future. It is only through more effective
train-and-equip programs standing up more socially inclusive, locally
based, and resilient security forces that the United States can truly help
“defeat” extremist proto-states such as ISIS.
Of course, the starting point of this security assistance dialogue
must include the formulation of clear strategic goals for the purpose of
identifying and developing capabilities to support those goals. In other
words, what is the strategic effect (both political changes and securityrelated partnerships) pursued by the United States in the region? Without
this consideration, the United States may find itself elevating a supporting strategy as a strategic goal, just as it did during the Vietnam conflict.
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The Author Replies
David E. Johnson

L

et me begin by thanking Colonel Wood and Dr. Spangler for
their thoughtful replies to my commentary. Indeed, they have
strengthened my argument for greater US involvement against
the Islamic State by placing it in a larger strategic context.
Both ask the obvious question if my call for action is heeded: “What
then?”
The answer is: In the aftermath of the destruction of the Islamic
State, the United States should maintain its training efforts to create
Iraqi Security Forces competent to suppress the resurgence of the
Islamic State, without the future need for US ground forces.
My reasoning is as follows. I believe the administration needs to
put the fight against the Islamic State in the broader context of what its
existence means for the region, our allies, and—most importantly—our
own security interests. In my view, Iraq is a secondary issue—it is where
the Islamic State has chosen to establish a large part of its so-called
caliphate. It is a cancer in the region that is spreading. The Islamic State
is also beyond the capacity of the Iraqi Government and current US
efforts to eradicate. Thus, the burden of defeating the Islamic State must
be taken up by US ground forces.
Combined US and Iraqi forces faced a similar situation in the 2004
Second Battle of Fallujah and the 2008 Battle of Sadr City. In each case,
terrorists had concentrated themselves in urban areas and created conditions that enabled their apparent destruction. In reality, the al Qaeda in
Iraq (AQI) and Shi’a militias were not eradicated, although many fighters were killed. The Islamic State, the successor to AQI, and the Shi’a
militias have returned. The Shi’a militias are challenging the legitimacy
of the Government of Iraq, while the Islamic State is a growing threat
to the region and the broader world as it expands its proto-state and
becomes a base for terrorist attacks, radicalization, and encourages lone
wolf attackers world-wide.
Our current strategy reminds me of the sad story of Steve Jobs,
Apple’s CEO. In October 2003, Jobs was diagnosed with a rare form
of pancreatic cancer that could have been arrested if he had agreed to
undergo immediate surgery and chemotherapy before the cancer could
spread further. According to Walter Isaacson, Job’s biographer, “To
the horror of his friends and wife, Jobs decided not to have surgery
to remove the tumor, which was the only accepted medical approach.”
Instead, he pursued homeopathic remedies he found on the internet and
through personal contacts.
Jobs finally had surgery nine months after initial diagnosis. The
cancer had spread to his liver; his doctors believed that if they had
operated when the cancer was first detected, “they might have caught it
before it spread.” After extended medical interventions, including a liver



Commentary & Reply

113

transplant, Jobs died on October 5, 2011 at age 56, from complications
from pancreatic cancer.
A friend of Jobs recalled that “He has that ability to ignore stuff that
he doesn’t want to confront.” This situation is not unlike our current
reluctance to introduce US ground forces into the fight against the
Islamic State. The relevance of Steve Jobs’s ordeal to the question of
“What then” may seem a bit strained, but I believe it is relevant. The
rapid conquest of key areas of Iraq—and the totally ineffectual performance of the Iraqi Army—was a tremendous shock to the US security
apparatus. But, what was to be done? As I outlined in my commentary,
the United States, as did Steve Jobs, has tried everything it could to avoid
the hard choice of life-saving surgery. In the case of the Islamic State,
competent US ground forces are needed to eliminate its presence in Iraq
before it spreads further. US policy-makers have avoided this difficult
choice, even though the American people (57% according to a February
2015 CBS News poll) seem to be increasingly supportive of sending US
ground forces to fight the Islamic State.
What would follow a US ground intervention is a reasonable question that must be answered. I believe competent US joint air-ground
forces would present the Islamic State with an existential crisis. The
advance of US ground forces would force the Islamic State fighters to
react, much like they did in Fallujah and Sadr City, in ways that would
make them visible and vulnerable to destruction by direct or indirect
fires from ground or air systems. I also believe the Islamic State cannot
cede large swaths of territory in Iraq and maintain its proto-state and
appeal. It would have to send reinforcements from Syria to attempt to
maintain its territory in Iraq, which would open these reinforcements to
air and other attacks. As I wrote in my original essay, the Islamic State
is not an insurgency, it is proto-state. Destroy the state, and there is no
base for receiving recruits or radicalizing foreign would be jihadists.
This would be, in my view, the ultimate and larger strategic purpose for
the US ground intervention.

